

Institutional Trust and Support for the Anti-Establishment: Evidence from the Netherlands and Italy

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Abstract

Why do voters support anti-establishment parties? Scholarship suggests that economic and cultural threats prompt voters to support radical right-wing parties. These theories, however, are constructed with only the radical right in mind, either conflating anti-establishment with the radical right, or neglecting the left entirely. I argue that low institutional trust drives voters toward anti-establishment parties on both the left and the right, and away from all establishment parties, even those in opposition. I leverage data from the 2010 Dutch parliamentary election and the 2013 Italian national election, low levels of institutional trust influence the selection of anti-establishment parties on the right (Party for Freedom-Netherlands) and the left (Five-Star Movement-Italy). In each case, an anti-establishment party went from a marginal political actor to the third largest party in domestic parliament. This finding indicates that social and economic fears may not be the primary drivers of anti-establishment support.

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European anti-establishment parties have become increasingly popular, often attaining the second or third most seats in their domestic parliaments. Parties such as the Party for Freedom (Netherlands), the Five-Star Movement (Italy), Podemos (Spain), and, most recently, Alternative for Deutschland (Germany), demonstrate that anti-establishment parties from the left and right are evolving from a marginal electoral position (Mudde 2007) to a viable and potentially influential role in domestic politics. In light of these parties' recent electoral successes, it is important to understand why voters support the anti-establishment.

Often, scholars pay attention to classic “demand-side” and “supply-side” explanations, which argue that radical right wing parties' xenophobic and populist rhetoric resonates with voters who possess deep economic and cultural fears, and that these parties manipulate advantageous attributes of the electoral system (Golder 2016, Bustikova 2014, Betz 1994, Mudde 2010, Inglehart 1977, Tajfel and Turner 1979). Though these explanations seem sufficient to account for the rise of non-traditional parties (e.g. Golder 2016), they are constructed primarily with the radical right in mind, and potentially ignoring anti-establishment parties from elsewhere on the political spectrum. Given the increasing viability of both left and right wing anti-establishment parties across Europe, it is important to understand why voters support the anti-establishment broadly.

I argue that current theories, constructed with the radical-right in mind and emphasizing the role of cultural economic fears, are insufficient to explain support for anti-establishment parties broadly. I argue that voters who possess low levels of institutional trust, or diffuse support, will be most likely to support these parties who assert that the political elite have mishandled public resources. In the American context, we observe that low levels of trust can lead to the support of third parties (Peterson and Wrighton 1998); however, this relationship has been little explored in Europe. Given the anti-elite nature of these parties, and their exploitation of individuals' low level of institutional trust, examining trust can illuminate support for anti-establishment parties on the ideological left and right.

Here I explore the phenomenon of anti-establishment parties through the lens of two

elections: the 2010 Dutch parliamentary election and the 2013 Italian general election. Both elections observed the success of anti-establishment parties: the right-wing Party for Freedom (PVV) in the Netherlands and the left-wing Five-Star Movement (M5S) in Italy. In each case, an anti-establishment party rose to a significant position in the domestic parliament, specifically, attaining the rank of third largest party in parliament. Using these two elections, I address what characteristics, beyond the traditional demand-side explanations of economic and cultural fears, prompt voters to choose an anti-establishment party. I argue that establishment political parties, both in government and in opposition, are often viewed as ineffective and detached from the electorate. In both cases, an individual's level of institutional trust made the difference in selecting between an established opposition party and an anti-establishment party. Low institutional trust prompted many citizens to seek not just any alternative to the incumbent government, but a distinctly anti-establishment one. This relationship holds even when controlling for the usual explanations of radical right-wing support, such as ideology, economic class, and attitudes on immigration.

I find that trust in institutions influenced voters to support the PVV and Five-Star Movement. However, those with higher levels of institutional trust were no more likely to select establishment opposition parties over the incumbent. These findings contribute to our understanding of the wider phenomenon of anti-establishment parties, extending beyond traditional explanations of radical right wing support. Further, the findings highlight the importance of considering the anti-establishment as a unique form of opposition in an increasingly anti-establishment friendly Europe, and underscore the importance of institutional trust in electoral behavior.

Vote Choice for the Anti-Establishment

Why would a voter select an outsider party that espouses an agenda largely divorced from the status quo? I argue that to best understand voters' motivations toward anti-establishment parties, one must examine institutional trust. Institutional trust can be

defined in different ways. Here, I conceive of institutional trust as deep-seated trust in domestic institutions. Trust in institutions, or diffuse support, reflects the confidence in the overarching political system (Norris 2005, Easton 1965). I argue that it is the decline in diffuse support of institutions that influences individuals to select anti-establishment politicians and parties. Scholarship has noted that in a consolidated democracy, this loss of institutional trust may prompt voters to seek outsider, or populist alternatives (Canovan 1981, ?, Hartleb 2015). Further, low institutional trust has been linked to vote choice of third parties in the United States and Canada as a way to express displeasure with the status quo (?, Peterson and Wrighton 1998, Bélanger and Nadeau 2005). As in Canada, European voters regularly have the option to select from more than two parties. This makes the choice of supporting opposition parties more complicated, as some opposition parties are part of the establishment. For example, the UK Labour Party currently serves as the establishment opposition party, counter to the Conservatives. I contend that low diffuse support, or institutional trust, motivates voters to support anti-establishment parties in a multi-party system in the same way it motivates voters to select third parties in the context of a two-party system such as the United States. Low trust in the system drives voters toward an anti-establishment alternative, and away from establishment parties, even those in opposition.

Influential scholarship has demonstrated that trust is influenced by vote choice or that poor incumbent performance affects trust (Citrin 1974, Citrin and Green 1986). There is ample evidence that the relationship between political discontent and votes for the anti-establishment can run in either direction (Rooduijn, Van Der Brug, and De Lange 2016), or that these parties' support is based on policy preferences (Van der Brug 2003). Certainly, the occurrence and magnitude of events such as a political or economic crisis may lead voters to blame incumbents for the poor handling of state interests (Duch and Stevenson 2008), and reduce trust (Citrin 1974, Citrin and Green 1986). While the story of incumbent missteps affecting citizen trust is compelling, numerous work rigorously demonstrates that institutional trust influences vote choice, particularly for North American third parties (Hetherington 1998, Hetherington 1999, Peterson and

Wrighton 1998, Bélanger and Nadeau 2005). Further, many studies contend that the decline of trust gives rise to protest parties (Gamson 1968, Betz and Immerfall 1998), indicating that trust is a precursor to the selection of anti-establishment parties. In fact, the emergence of new parties may represent a pre-existing condition of political distrust amongst the electorate (Miller and Listhaug 1990).

Along this point, many scholars are in agreement that “trust encompasses deep-seated feelings” (Citrin and Luks 2001, 11) about the political system (Norris 1999, Inglehart 1995, Inglehart and Norris 2017, Abramson, Ellis, and Inglehart 1997). Further, scholars note that institutional trust is both stable over time (Peterson and Wrighton 1998), and is more strongly linked to diffuse support of the overarching political system and institutions than it is to policy attitudes or incumbent assessment (Bélanger and Nadeau 2005, Peterson and Wrighton 1998, Hetherington 1998, Miller and Listhaug 1990, Miller 1974). This link and the empirical observation by many scholars that trust is on a continuing downward spiral, indicate that institutional trust, or diffuse support, being influenced by incumbent evaluations is unlikely (Peterson and Wrighton 1998).

In this vein, I argue that institutional trust is theoretically a precursor to an individual’s vote choice. Low levels of trust and a lack of diffuse support for the system influence whether a citizen selects a traditional, establishment party or an anti-establishment or “outsider” party. The selection of an anti-establishment alternative is a reflection of declining systemic trust possessed by some citizens.

Extant literature largely focuses on voting for the radical right, implicitly equating radical-right wing parties to the anti-establishment movement. Research espouses that voters’ economic or cultural fears influence the choice of a radical right wing party (Bustikova 2014, Inglehart and Norris 2017, Duch and Stevenson 2008, Fitzgerald et al. 2012, Golder 2003). Scholarship argues that those citizens who are economically displaced by modernization (Inglehart and Norris 2017), economic downturn (Golder 2016, Jackman and Volpert 1996), immigrant labor (Knigge 1998, Ivarsflaten 2008) or trade agreements (low skill, low mobility) (Betz 1994, Lucassen and Lubbers 2012, Lubbers, Gijssberts, and Scheepers 2002) or those in areas otherwise affected by economic recession are more sup-

portive of radical right wing parties and policies that spout protectionism. Individuals who may have lost jobs under establishment parties' leadership may seek out the radical parties or anti-establishment parties offering to remedy economic woes (Lewis-Beck and Mitchell 1993, Golder 2003). In Europe, two trends are noteworthy: the support of radical and anti-establishment parties as a backlash towards European integration (Hooghe and Wilson 2002), and the attitudes towards immigrants stemming from the recent refugee crisis (Fitzgerald et al. 2012).

While these demand side explanations are empirically supported, they are constructed almost wholly with the radical right in mind, conflating radical right parties with all anti-establishment groups. Parties, such as the Italian Five Star Movement (M5S), who reside on the ideological left, but may draw previously inactive supporters from elsewhere on the ideological spectrum (Natale 2014, Franzosi, Marone, and Salvati 2015), are often neglected. The conflation of the radical right with the anti-establishment has also led scholars to ignore other potential explanations for their popularity-including the decline in institutional trust, assuming that xenophobic attitudes are the most consequential for parties on the right such as the Dutch Party for Freedom (PVV) (Rydgren 2008).

It is the decline of diffuse support for a system believed to be irretrievably broken that drives support for outsider, or anti-establishment parties. As noted with radical right parties, outsider parties are able to amplify concerns of the public and portray them as widespread crises (Hartleb 2015, Williams 2006, Rooduijn, Van Der Brug, and De Lange 2016, Van der Brug 2003). When trust is low, support for existing political structures, politicians, and parties wanes. If individuals believe their political system is rife with corruption, then the most logical course of action is to seek out remedies outside of existing political institutions.

Anti-establishment parties thrive in a low-trust environment. Using populist and nationalist rhetoric, these parties often allege severe corruption on the part of the political elite (Bustikova 2014, Betz 1994, Abedi and Lundberg 2009, Albertazzi and McDonnell 2008, Inglehart and Norris 2017, McDonnell and Newell 2011, Taggart 2004). Informal sources such as blogs, and statements to the press reveal this sentiment. From the left,

Five-Star founder Beppe Grillo asserts, “political amateurs are conquering the world because the ‘experts’ destroyed it,” indicating widespread corruption and conspiracies by the political elite to swindle or cheat the everyday citizen.¹

From the right, we hear similar allegations. Frauke Petry, former leader of the German anti-establishment Alternative for Deutschland (AfD) party once said, “The fact that the AfD exists is a symptom of the failure of the traditional parties, who have lost the ability to solve problems.”² PVV leader, Geert Wilders often asserts that the Dutch government incompetently handles large problems, specifically immigration (Van Kessel 2011). This sentiment, that the political elite has failed the common citizen, is expressed by anti-establishment parties from all areas of the political spectrum. This sentiment reflects populist notion that there exists a fundamental conflict between the “pure people,” and the “corrupt elite” (Mudde 2004, p.543).

Thus, anti-establishment parties occupy a unique place in domestic political systems. They represent not only an opposition to the governing incumbent parties, but also any mainstream party (Abedi 2009). Presenting themselves as a unique brand of opposition, they tout an agenda that is counter the status quo, asserting that traditional politicians have somehow violated the public trust, and therefore, all traditional establishment parties, even those in opposition, cannot be considered adequate replacements for the incumbent (Hartleb 2015). While it has been recently noted that these parties can emerge from both the left and right (Abedi 2009, Abedi and Lundberg 2009, Hartleb 2015, Mosca 2014, Golder 2016), a unified theory and analysis of voters’ propensity to support right and left-wing anti-establishment parties has not been fully realized.

Recognizing that these parties represent a unique form of opposition, I argue that low

¹In an interview with *Euronews* November 14, 2016. <http://www.euronews.com/2016/11/14/political-amateurs-are-conquering-the-world-beppe-grillo-tells-euronews>.

²See “Mea Culpa from Merkel on Migrants After Election Drubbing.” <http://www.euronews.com/2016/09/19/germany-mea-culpa-from-merkel-on-migrants-after-election-drubbing>. September 19, 2016.

institutional trust will influence voters to seek electoral alternatives outside of mainstream parties. While we may accept that low trust may prompt a voter to choose a third party (?), we do not know if trust will prompt a voter to choose the anti-establishment option even over the challenger and the incumbent. Those voters who are higher in institutional trust will seek out an establishment alternative-whether it is an incumbent or an opposition party. When institutional trust is low, even the opposition will not provide sufficient amount of change for the anti-establishment voter, and they will then seek outsiders to govern (Canovan 1981).

Because of their unique position in the political system, and their insistence that the current political elite are corrupt, anti-establishment parties' messages resonate best with citizens low in institutional trust. When frustrated with the system, the rational course is to seek remedies outside the current political environment. Therefore, those with low levels of institutional trust will seek out anti-establishment alternatives to the mainstream and traditional status quo, including establishment opposition parties.

Hypothesis: Voters low in institutional trust are more likely to support an anti-establishment party than any establishment party, including the incumbent and opposition parties.

The Dutch and Italian Cases

The Dutch parliamentary election of 2010³ and Italian general election of 2013 share interesting parallels, making them ideal cases through which to examine the popularity of anti-establishment parties on the right (Netherlands) and the left (Italy). In both cases, the anti-establishment party became the third largest party or group in the domestic

³While the 2012 data is more recent and available, I choose to examine the 2010 election, due to the fact that the PVV went from a marginal party with only 6 seats, to the third largest party in the Dutch parliament. Thus reflecting the moment when the PVV became an electorally viable party.

parliament.⁴ Each party is headed by flamboyant leaders who regularly use the media to draw attention to their rhetoric. Further, in each case the establishment opposition party closest ideologically to the anti-establishment party won the election (The Dutch People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD), and the Italian Democratic Party (PD)), beating out a center-right incumbent party. This highlights how in each country voters had a choice on two dimensions: ideology; and antipathy towards elites. While similar in many ways, the countries also vary in important aspects. Institutionally, they have different electoral rules and structures. Also, they vary in terms of wealth, with Italy being one of the most indebted countries in the European Union, and at the forefront of the refugee crisis. Below, I highlight each country’s political environment on the eve of these two elections.

The Netherlands 2010

The Netherlands is no stranger to xenophobic and anti-elite voting (Rydgren 2008, Akkerman 2005). So-called populist parties, such as List Pym Fortuyn (LPF) have enjoyed a certain amount of popularity, but have rarely been electorally successful (Van Kessel 2011). In the past decade, Dutch voters have been cited as being “increasingly detached” from the establishment parties (Van Kessel 2011, 69). The latest party to capture the detached Dutch voter is the Party for Freedom (PVV), led by Geert Wilders. Under Wilders’ leadership, the PVV has been able to fill a void left by the collapse of the LPF (Vossen 2010), which catered to those voters who were anti-immigrant, anti-foreign, and anti-Dutch values (Akkerman 2005).

Dutch voters who feel that mainstream political establishment parties are incapable of handling the current problems facing the country—in this case immigration—are drawn to the PVV (Van Kessel 2011, Vossen 2010). These voters follow a pattern of desiring harsher immigration restrictions and tougher punishments for crime in general (Akkerman 2005, Vossen 2010). In this vein, Wilders has been a champion for these voters. Not only

⁴In the case of the Italian Five-Star Movement, the party was actually the largest single winning party, but refused to join any coalitions. Therefore, it is the third largest parliamentary group.

has he been sanctioned for anti-Islam rhetoric, notably making a blatantly anti-Islam movie in 2008, but he was also banned from the United Kingdom in 2009 due to his hostile and anti-Islam language (Vossen 2010).

Citizens in the Netherlands most likely to support the PVV and other “outsider” parties have been found to possess high levels of protest attitudes-distinguishing them from mainstream voters (Schumacher and Rooduijn 2013). The Netherlands in 2010 provided fertile ground for the rise of the Wilders and the PVV. While the party won a handful of seats in 2006, they were largely inconsequential. However, as the refugee crisis deepened in severity, the PVV-with their largely xenophobic agenda was able to gain ground. Successfully portraying themselves as the party to remedy the incompetencies of the mainstream, the PVV propelled into third place, gaining fifteen seats, and backing a minority government led by the People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD).

Italy 2013

Like the Netherlands, the Italian political environment in 2013 was primed for an anti-establishment success. Italy is of course no stranger to volatility and scandal. Notably, nationwide judicial investigations in the early 1990s ultimately led to multiple politicians’ resignations (Vannucci 2009) and the rise of the first “outsider” Silvio Berlusconi, and his new party Forza Italia (FI) in 1994. Berlusconi’s downfall in 2011 prompted the birth of a new anti-elite party.

In 2009, Beppe Grillo, a stand-up comedian, and Gianroberto Casaleggio, a internet strategist, formed the Movimento Cinque Stelle, the “Five Star Movement” (M5S). The movement rejected traditional politics and attempted to defend the protection of public amenities and speak for the mass public, who they argued were abandoned by the corrupt elite (Diamanti 2014, Mosca 2014, Natale 2014).

After great success in the 2012 regional and local elections, the new party entered parliament in 2013 with the third highest number of seats. Because they refused to form coalitions with any of the establishment parties, they currently serve as the largest opposition party in the Italian Chamber of Deputies. Italy’s long history with political scandal

makes the rise of a party, such as the Five-Star Movement, unsurprising. The culmination of scandals, and economic and political crises served to erode public trust in institutions. The erosion of public trust led Italian voters to seek out an anti-establishment alternative from the status quo.

Data and Methods

Succinctly, I argue that low institutional trust will increase support for anti-establishment parties. Further, voters with high levels of institutional trust will seek out establishment opposition parties. I use the 2010 Dutch Parliamentary Election Study and the 2013 Italian National Election Study (ITANES) to assess the influence of trust on vote choice and support for anti-establishment parties. Here, I follow other scholars and conceive of anti-establishment parties as those that position themselves counter to the status quo, and mainstream parties, and espouse nationalist and populist rhetoric (Abedi 2009, Hartleb 2015). Anti-establishment groups often employ calls for populism by asserting the need for more referenda, and levels of protectionism, asking to place native citizens first in the priorities of elected officials. In this regard, left-wing parties such as the Five Star Movement⁵ have much in common with some right wing parties such as the PVV and the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP).⁶

Dependent Variables

First, I use probit models to assess the probability of a citizen voting for the PVV in Netherlands and the M5S in Italy. The dependent variables are dichotomous measures where “1” represents a vote for the anti-establishment party, and “0” indicates a vote

⁵There is some debate as to whether the Five Star Movement constitutes a true “left” party. Indeed, recent developments with the party indicated that it may indeed blur the lines between the left and the right. However, at the time of the 2013 election, the party was decidedly left-leaning. In fact, its RILE score was -49.03 (from the Comparative Manifesto Project).

⁶In fact, the Five Star Movement often allies itself with UKIP in the European Parliament.

for any other party. While this provides an initial glance at how likely a voter is to choose an anti-establishment alternative over any other party, the more serious question is when will a voter choose the anti-establishment over an establishment alternative, such as the incumbent or the opposition. Therefore, I use a multinomial logit to test the likelihood of a voter selecting the anti-establishment party relative to the other establishment alternatives: the incumbent and the opposition.

In the Netherlands, this is fairly straight forward. The incumbent government was run by a coalition headed by Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA)-and elections were called after its resignation. The Labour Party (PvdA) governed in coalition with the CDA. The main establishment challenger was the People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD), a centre-right party, and the main anti-establishment challenger was the PVV-situated on the far right. I code the dependent variable for the Dutch multinomial analysis as follows: “1” for the incumbent CDA, “2” for the PvdA-coalition partner but left of center, “3” for the VVD, and “4” for the PVV.

Italian parties, like those in many other multi-party systems, align themselves electorally with other parties (Bartolini, Chiaramonte, and D’Alimonte 2004, Golder 2006). Italy had three major establishment coalitions running in 2013. The first was the incumbent Centre Coalition, led by Civic Choice (SC) and joined by Union of the Democratic Center (UdC), and the party for the Future and Freedom of Italy (FLI). Also, two opposition coalitions formed. The “Left Alliance” was led by the Democratic Party (PD) and joined by the Left Ecology and Freedom Party (SEL), the Democratic Centre (DC), the Crocetta List, and the South Tyrolean People’s Party (SVP). Finally, the “Right Coalition” was led by the People of Freedom (PdL) and joined by the Brothers of Italy, Lega Nord, La Destra (the Right), the Pensioners Party, the Great South (MPA), and Moderates in Revolution (MIR). Therefore the dependent variable for the multinomial analysis is a four-value variable taking the value of “1” if the respondent voted for the incumbent coalition, “2” if she voted for the Left Alliance, “3” if she voted for the Right Coalition, and “4” if she voted for the M5S.⁷

⁷Lega Nord, a xenophobic and radical right party, is often considered anti-establishment (Abedi 2009).

Independent Variables

The main explanatory variable in the analysis is institutional trust. Because I am interested in diffuse support, I look to capture how much trust the citizen has in domestic political institutions (Norris 2005). In each survey four questions are used to construct an additive measure. For each question in the Dutch survey, there is a comparable question in the Italian survey. Respondents in both countries were asked, “How much trust or confidence do you have in the (Parliament, Political Parties, Banks, the Government(Netherlands)/the President(Italy))?” In the Netherlands the choices were “None,” “Not So Much,” “A Fair Amount,” “Very Much.” In Italy respondents’ choices were “None,” “A little,” “A Fair Amount,” or “A Great Deal.” For each question in each country, “4” represents a great deal of trust, and “1” represents no trust.⁸ While it may be argued that “trust in banks” does not capture an individual’s level of trust with the overarching political system, I contend that it is still relevant for assessing institutional trust. Many anti-establishment parties, including the Five-Star Movement accuse industries, corporations, and private firms as being intricately tied to politics, which further fuels their rhetoric of corruption and assertion that political elite do not represent the interests of the people.⁹

While the main focus of the analysis is diffuse support (institutional trust), I control

In this election they ran in a coalition with establishment opposition parties. Ideally, I would be able to run an analysis predicting the votes for Lega Nord. However, in the survey used, only 22 respondents reported voting for Lega Nord. To assuage any concerns that voting for the Right Alliance may indicate an anti-establishment preference, I run the Italian multinomial analysis dropping the 22 Lega Nord voters, available in the Appendix.

⁸Factor analysis confirms that these four questions all positively loaded onto the same factor, indicating that they all represent the same latent concept, in this case: diffuse support or institutional trust. In the Netherlands the eigenvalue=1.81, with “trust in banks” having the lowest factor loading (0.27). In Italy, the eigenvalue=1.06, with “trust in banks having the lowest factor loading (0.13).

⁹I also run regressions with each question individually. Results are available in the Appendix.

for how specific support may influence vote choice. I therefore look to capture how positively the respondent evaluates the incumbent government. In the Netherlands, I use government satisfaction to assess the level of specific support. Respondents were asked to rate their level of satisfaction with the government on a 5 point scale from “Very Dissatisfied” to “Very Satisfied.” In the Italian case respondents are asked how positively they rate the incumbent Prime Minister’s (in this case, Mario Monti) economic policies. This variable captures the level of specific support the respondent has for the current government and its policies. Respondents were asked to rate Monti’s policies on a scale from 0-10, where “0” is the most negative evaluation and “10” is the most positive.

I also control for a number of potential confounding variables. Certain demographic attributes have been linked to voting for the radical right wing, and therefore, could be related to voting for other anti-establishment parties. For both countries, I control for respondents’ gender (*female*) (Betz 1994, Lubbers, Gijsberts, and Scheepers 2002), age, education (possession of a college degree (“1”) in Italy, levels of education in the Netherlands), employment status: “1” for employed, “0,” otherwise (Arzheimer and Carter 2006), marital status (“1” for married, “0,” otherwise), and economic class (whether or not the respondent is employed as an unskilled worker in Italy, or if one considers herself “working class” in Netherlands) (?). In the Dutch survey, I am also able to control for income level. In Italy, I control for frequency of religious attendance, and whether or not the respondent is Catholic.

In addition to demographic variables, I control for respondents’ ideology. A person may vote for a particular party simply because it most closely matches her political preferences. The variable *ideology* is a self-rating 10 point scale, where “10” is the most conservative value. I also control for a person’s level of political interest, as those who are more interested in politics are more likely to seek out information. In both countries, the anti-establishment garners a lot of media coverage, whether it’s Geert Wilders’ explosive statements on Islam, or Grillo’s antics (such as swimming the Strait of Messina for the 2012 regional elections). This may mean that those tuning-in to the coverage of the election were influenced to support an anti-establishment party—simply by the volume of

attention devoted to these flamboyant candidates.

Finally, I control for a few policy attitude variables. Immigration is a salient topic in Europe and has been used to explain radical right-wing support (Ivarsflaten 2008, ?). It is especially imperative that I control for immigration attitudes in the Dutch analysis, given the provocative rhetoric of Wilders and the PVV regarding to Islam and immigrants. In both analyses higher values of the variable *Immigration Opinion* reflect a more positive attitude toward immigration/immigrants. In the Dutch analysis it is a four point variable assessing how much the respondent agrees that illegal immigrants should be allowed to stay in the country, where “4” indicates full agreement that illegal immigrants should be allowed to stay in the Netherlands. In the Italian analysis it is a variable measuring an individual’s opinion on whether Italy accepts too many immigrants. It ranges 1-7, where “1” indicates the respondent thinks Italy accepts too many immigrants, and “7” indicates the respondent thinks Italy could accept more. Many “anti-establishment” parties in Europe are euroskeptic, and the PVV and the M5S are no exception (Vossen 2010, Franzosi, Marone, and Salvati 2015). In both analyses, *EU Opinion* is a variable that measures how positively the respondent feels about the European Union (EU). In both countries, it ranges 1-3, where “3” indicates that the respondent feels that their country’s membership in EU is a “good thing.”

Results

Tables 1 and 2 display the probit results from the Dutch and Italian analyses, respectively. Coefficients for probit models are not directly interpretable. Therefore, Figure 1 presents predicted probabilities from the probit model assessing votes for the PVV. Figure 2 presents predicted probabilities from the probit model assessing votes for the M5S. Both figures plot the probabilities for voting for the anti-establishment party at different levels of trust, holding all other variables at their observed values.

In both countries, institutional trust has a statistically significant and negative influence on voting for the anti-establishment. In the Netherlands, voters expressing the

lowest levels of institutional trust had a 20% probability of voting for the PVV over all other parties. When moving from the lowest level of trust to the highest, this probability drops to nearly roughly 3%. Results are similar for Italy. At the at lowest levels of trust, there is a nearly 30% probability that a respondent will vote for the M5S. With an increase of each level of trust, the probability of voting for the M5S decreases by approximately 10% points. At the highest level of trust, a respondent has a 3% probability of voting for the M5S.

In the Netherlands, these results hold even when controlling for the usual explanations of voting for the radical right, such as immigration opinion, opinion on the EU, and being a working class voter. In Italy, it is especially important to note that some classic explanations for supporting radical right wing parties, such as demographics, employment status, level of education, and opinion of immigration did not have a statistically significant effect on the the probability of voting for the M5S over all other parties. This is initial evidence that other factors, such as institutional trust, may matter more for selecting anti-establishment parties, and this may particularly hold for those parties on the left.

[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE]

[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE]

[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE]

[FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE]

While the probit models are informative of an individual's probability of voting for a particular party (PVV or M5S) versus all other parties, it does not reveal much about the actual decision calculus a voter makes in casting her ballot. When voting, an individual chooses between the incumbent and multiple challengers. This is the case for voters in both countries. In both contexts, I identify three establishment choices and one anti-establishment choice.

The Multinomial models capture this decision calculus. Because every election can be viewed as a referendum on the incumbent, I use the incumbent party (the Dutch CDA

and the Italian Centre Coalition) as the reference category in each analysis. This captures the likelihood of voting for all opposition parties (establishment and anti-establishment) over the incumbent.

In the Dutch case, trust does not play a significant role in predicting votes for the establishment opposition parties over the incumbent. However, it does play a statistically significant role in influencing the selection of an anti-establishment party, in this case the PVV, relative to the incumbent. Exponentiating the coefficient reveals that with an increase in each level of trust, a voter is roughly 20% less likely to vote for the PVV relative to the incumbent, the CDA.

[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE]

In Italy results are similar. Institutional trust does not appear to influence a voter's support of the establishment right-wing opposition (Right Coalition) relative to the incumbent. However, trust does decrease a respondent's likelihood of choosing the Five-Star Movement relative to the incumbent. Specifically, an increase in the level of trust corresponds to 12% decrease in the probability of voting for the M5S relative to the incumbent. In both countries, institutional trust serves to decrease a voters' likelihood of voting for the anti-establishment party. These results hold, even when controlling for the usual demand-side explanations of radical right wing support.

[TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE]

While it is evident that low institutional trust plays a role in supporting the anti-establishment over the incumbent, what role does it play in the decision to support an anti-establishment party over an ideologically similar establishment opposition party? In both countries, the incumbent government was challenged by an establishment opposition party and an anti-establishment party from the opposite side of the ideological spectrum. In the Netherlands, the centrist incumbent CDA was challenged from the right by the VVD and the PVV. In Italy, the center-right incumbent, Civic Choice was challenged from the left by the PD (leading the Left Alliance) and the Five Star Movement. Table 5 compares voting for the anti-establishment party relative to the establishment opposition

party that is from the same side of the ideological spectrum. Column 1 displays the likelihood of voting for the PVV relative to the VVD. Column 2 displays the likelihood of voting for the M5S relative to the Left-Alliance, led by the PD.

In both countries, moving up a level of trust corresponds to a roughly 24% decrease in the probability of voting for the anti-establishment party relative to an ideologically similar establishment opposition party. The implication is that those who are distrustful will not seek an establishment party or coalition, as selecting any establishment party, even those in opposition, may not present enough of a departure from the status quo. In both the Netherlands and Italy, when the choice was between an establishment opposition party and an anti-establishment party of similar ideological positioning, those who expressed low institutional trust preferred the anti-establishment alternative. The broader implication here is that personal ideology may drive a voter to the left or right, but institutional trust (diffuse support) will drive them to or from the mainstream.

[TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE]

Conclusion and Discussion

An anti-establishment party represents a unique form of opposition, one that situates itself as an electoral alternative to failed and seemingly corruption-plagued mainstream parties. What drives voters to support such a drastic alternative to the status quo? Are the classic demand-side explanations of radical-right-wing support sufficient to explain support for anti-establishment parties from all areas of the political spectrum? The current analysis suggests that they are not. The recent successes of parties such as the Five-Star Movement, Podemos, AfD, and the PVV, prompt us to consider additional factors behind their support.

In both the Netherlands and Italy, those voters with low levels of institutional trust are more likely to support the anti-establishment than the incumbent or the establishment opposition. In each case it also appears that those with high levels of trust are just as likely to support the incumbent or an establishment opposition alternative. This

indicates that there is a difference in the minds of establishment supporters between broad systemic performance and the performance of specific policies and politicians. Additional research is needed to explore whether these relationships are conditional. For now, results indicate that those who voted for the PVV or the Five-Star Movement possessed low trust in the system, whereas those who were simply dissatisfied with policies of the incumbent selected an establishment alternative. What's more is that in both cases, trust influenced vote choice between an establishment opposition party and a similarly ideologically positioned anti-establishment party. It may be that two separate dimensions exist for voters: ideology and anti-establishment.

How do these two elections help us understand the rise of the anti-establishment more broadly? As anti-establishment parties continue to increase their electoral viability, we must consider that not all of them fit strictly into the category of radical right wing parties. At the time, the M5S was distinctly left, but drew supporters from across the ideological spectrum. The PVV seems to exist at the intersection of radical-right and anti-establishment, indicating that scholars may need to take special care when theorizing about voter support for these outsider parties. Standard explanations of support for the radical right should be re-considered. It is not enough to classify these parties according to standard ideology, as their appeal transcends ideological proximity to voters. Ideology is only part of the formula of their attraction to voters. They appeal to those voters who lack trust and are dissatisfied with the status quo. Citizens may still divide along the left-right dimension, but trust may explain what divides them along the mainstream-anti-establishment dimension. Those who lack trust come from all socio-economic backgrounds and levels of education. While economic fears and cultural threats from increased immigration may drive voters to right wing parties, trust influences voters regardless of socio-economic status or cultural fears. This is especially true in the case of Italy, where typical explanations of radical right wing support did not significantly influence supporters of the M5S. Further research is needed to explore how left-wing anti-establishment parties differ from their right wing counterparts.

With the recent electoral viability of Alternative for Deutschland (AfD) in Germany,

the PVV in the Netherlands, and the popularity of these parties in the European Parliament, the widespread appeal of these parties cannot be denied. Parties that flaunt their differences from the mainstream, while stressing the failures of traditional parties seem to share similar rhetoric. However, the driving motivations of their supporters may be different. These parties stand to substantially impact their domestic political environments. In 2016, the Five-Star Movement successfully thwarted a constitutional referendum, leading to the resignation of the Prime Minister. In 2018, their increasing popularity once again garnered them the most votes of any single party in the general election.

As research in this area progresses, it will become increasingly important to consider other aspects of the anti-establishment phenomenon. Understanding how these parties behave and how receptive voters are towards the rhetoric, activities, and ideological positioning of these parties will be key in determining why voters would select seemingly unqualified and extreme candidates. Understanding the dynamics of these parties and their voters will require more than the traditional literature on the radical right. Trust in traditional European parties and politicians appears to be irretrievably broken in the minds of voters. They are seeking a solution outside of politics. Whether this solution comes from the left or the right may not matter. What may be more salient, is whether it comes from the outside the political status quo or from within.

Tables and Figures

Table 1. Main Results-Netherlands

	Probability of Voting for the Party for Freedom (PVV)
Institutional Trust	-0.113*** (0.0305)
Government Satisfaction	-0.248*** (0.0648)
Ideology	0.148*** (0.0233)
Immigration Opinion	-0.235*** (0.0710)
EU Opinion	-0.307*** (0.0732)
Education	-0.264*** (0.0492)
Employed	-0.0721 (0.142)
Income	-0.0162* (0.00957)
Working Class	0.260** (0.114)
Interest	-0.127 (0.101)
Married	0.109 (0.116)
Female	-0.186* (0.103)
Age	-0.0190*** (0.00398)
Constant	3.128*** (0.477)
Observations	1,638

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table 2. Italian Probit Model: Predicting Support for the Five Star Movement

Probability of Voting for the Five Star Movement	
Institutional Trust	-0.0986*** (0.0229)
Evaluations of Incumbent (Monti)	-0.0400* (0.0236)
Ideology	-0.0718*** (0.0201)
Immigration Opinion	0.0108 (0.0320)
EU Opinion	-0.0937 (0.0667)
College Educated	0.153 (0.111)
Employed	-0.128 (0.103)
Unskilled Worker	0.449** (0.215)
Married	0.147 (0.119)
Catholic	0.177 (0.175)
Religious Services Attendance	-0.00984 (0.0212)
Interest	0.110* (0.0616)
Female	0.0368 (0.0998)
Age	-0.0186*** (0.00349)
Constant	0.706** (0.326)
Observations	1,079

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.




Figure 1. Predicted Probability of Voting for the PVV: Probit Model




Figure 2. Predicted Probability of Voting for the M5S: Probit Model

Table 3. Netherlands-Multinomial Results

	Voting for the PvdA v. Incumbent	Voting for the VVD v. Incumbent	Voting for the PVV v. Incumbent
Institutional Trust	-0.00501 (0.0816)	0.0526 (0.0658)	-0.226*** (0.0817)
Government Satisfaction	-0.982*** (0.168)	-0.967*** (0.145)	-1.257*** (0.182)
Ideology	-0.889*** (0.0761)	0.168*** (0.0585)	-0.0404 (0.0788)
Immigration Opinion	0.214 (0.159)	-0.276** (0.136)	-0.543*** (0.178)
EU Opinion	0.158 (0.215)	-0.00205 (0.170)	-0.503** (0.200)
Education	-0.195 (0.127)	0.392*** (0.113)	-0.428*** (0.131)
Employed	-0.0953 (0.343)	0.329 (0.280)	-0.164 (0.367)
Income	0.0310 (0.0227)	0.0186 (0.0190)	-0.0210 (0.0241)
Working Class	0.226 (0.303)	-0.338 (0.276)	0.439 (0.302)
Interest	0.403 (0.249)	0.0615 (0.205)	-0.0935 (0.263)
Married	-0.217 (0.251)	-0.292 (0.213)	-0.126 (0.286)
Female	-0.994*** (0.252)	-0.554*** (0.202)	-0.987*** (0.263)
Age	-0.0243** (0.0101)	-0.0157** (0.00801)	-0.0504*** (0.0103)
Constant	8.441*** (1.456)	1.794 (1.309)	13.23*** (1.554)
Observations	1,059	1,059	1,059

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses.

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$. Multinomial results of voting for the three opposition parties over the incumbent, CDA (voting for the incumbent is the base category). Column 3 captures the relative probability of voting for the PVV (anti-establishment) over the incumbent.

Table 4. Italy-Multinomial Results

	Voting for the Left v. Incumbent	Voting for the Right v. Incumbent	Voting for the M5S v. Incumbent
Institutional Trust	0.149** (0.0707)	-0.00547 (0.0752)	-0.136* (0.0738)
Evaluations of Incumbent	-0.448*** (0.0895)	-0.549*** (0.0955)	-0.623*** (0.0932)
Ideology	-0.884*** (0.0993)	0.491*** (0.103)	-0.410*** (0.0945)
Immigration Opinion	0.140 (0.111)	-0.0862 (0.127)	0.0591 (0.116)
EU Opinion	0.00678 (0.244)	-0.156 (0.251)	-0.161 (0.245)
College Educated	-0.642* (0.364)	-0.695* (0.401)	-0.445 (0.372)
Employed	-0.143 (0.356)	-0.189 (0.396)	-0.436 (0.365)
Unskilled Worker	0.610 (1.157)	0.635 (1.166)	1.268 (1.120)
Married	-0.432 (0.392)	-0.390 (0.421)	-0.202 (0.409)
Catholic	-1.105 (0.895)	-0.894 (0.986)	-1.036 (0.906)
Religious Attendance	-0.00417 (0.0809)	-0.0993 (0.0899)	-0.0828 (0.0830)
Interest	0.221 (0.223)	-0.149 (0.239)	0.281 (0.228)
Female	-0.259 (0.341)	-0.407 (0.374)	-0.202 (0.355)
Age	0.00366 (0.0122)	0.0115 (0.0127)	-0.0322** (0.0126)
Constant	7.107*** (1.514)	2.095 (1.663)	9.484*** (1.541)
Observations	756	756	756

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses.

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$. Multinomial results of voting for the three opposition parties over the incumbent, Centre Coalition (voting for the incumbent is the base category). Column 3 captures the relative probability of voting for the M5S (anti-establishment) over the incumbent.

Table 5. Voting for the Anti-Establishment v. Establishment Opposition

	Voting for the PVV v. VVD (Netherlands)	Voting for the M5S v. Left Alliance (Italy)
Institutional Trust	-0.278*** (0.0721)	-0.284*** (0.0505)
Government Satisfaction (Dutch)/ Incumbent Evaluations (Italy)	-0.290* (0.150)	-0.175*** (0.0561)
Ideology	-0.208*** (0.0585)	0.474*** (0.0680)
Employed	-0.494 (0.328)	-0.294 (0.235)
Immigration Opinion	-0.268* (0.159)	-0.0811 (0.0730)
EU Opinion	-0.501*** (0.166)	-0.167 (0.152)
Interest	-0.155 (0.227)	0.0601 (0.147)
Income	-0.0396* (0.0204)	
Working Class	0.778*** (0.265)	
Unskilled Worker		0.658 (0.520)
Education (Dutch)	-0.819*** (0.125)	
College Educated (Italy)		0.196 (0.255)
Age	-0.0347*** (0.00946)	-0.0358*** (0.00801)
Female	-0.433* (0.237)	0.0574 (0.227)
Married	0.166 (0.262)	0.230 (0.268)
Catholic		0.0697 (0.393)
Religious Attendance		-0.0786 (0.0490)
Constant	11.43*** (1.391)	2.377*** (0.766)
Observations	1,059	756

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses.

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$. Multinomial results of voting for the anti-establishment parties (PVV or M5S) relative to an establishment opposition party with similar ideology (voting for establishment opposition party is the base category). The VVD is the right-wing establishment opposition party in the Netherlands for 2010. The Left-Alliance, led by the PD was the left-wing establishment opposition party in Italy for 2013.

Appendix

Table A1. Summary statistics: All Variables

Variable	Obs	Italy			
		Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Trust Parliament	1481	1.951	.774	1	4
Trust Parties	1490	1.674	.697	1	4
Trust President	1487	2.894	.907	1	4
Trust Banks	1495	.389	1.481	-1	4
Evaluations of Monti Gov.	1478	2.888	2.201	0	10
College Educated	1508	.275	.446	0	1
Married	1508	.607	.489	0	1
Catholic	1508	.887	.316	0	1
Employed	1504	.454	.498	0	1
Unskilled Worker	1496	.049	.216	0	1
Ideology	1212	4.959	2.507	1	10
Religious Attendance	1488	3.603	2.407	0	7
Immigration Opinion	1451	2.493	1.674	1	7
Interest in Politics	1506	2.199	.856	1	4
EU Opinion	1455	2.28	.787	1	3
Female	1508	.501	.5	0	1
Age	1508	49.414	17.71	18	92
Variable	Obs	Netherlands			
		Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Trust Parliament	2123	2.649	.589	1	4
Trust Parties	2116	2.523	.565	1	4
Trust Government	2128	2.618	.593	1	4
Trust Banks	2134	2.254	.735	1	4
Government Satisfaction	2583	2.87	.841	1	5
Age	2621	48.551	17.214	17	95
Female	2621	.506	.5	0	1
Married	2576	.576	.494	0	1
Education	2440	3.693	1.235	1	5
Employed	2621	.62	.486	0	1
Immigration	2454	2.372	.796	1	4
EU Opinion	2201	2.502	.665	1	3
Interest	2621	1.952	.573	1	3
Income	2617	10.672	5.715	1	20
Working Class	2534	.295	.456	0	1
Ideology	2125	5.144	2.347	0	10

Table A2. Probit Models with Trust Disaggregated: Netherlands

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Probability of Voting for the PVV				
Trust in Parliament	-0.406*** (0.0945)			
Trust in Parties		-0.164* (0.0957)		
Trust in Government			-0.366*** (0.0905)	
Trust in Banks				-0.0808 (0.0687)
Government Satisfaction	-0.257*** (0.0639)	-0.295*** (0.0624)	-0.247*** (0.0647)	-0.311*** (0.0613)
Age	-0.0182*** (0.00399)	-0.0180*** (0.00388)	-0.0182*** (0.00395)	-0.0181*** (0.00388)
Female	-0.199* (0.102)	-0.196* (0.102)	-0.201** (0.102)	-0.179* (0.101)
Married	0.0927 (0.117)	0.116 (0.115)	0.105 (0.115)	0.108 (0.115)
Education	-0.256*** (0.0490)	-0.260*** (0.0490)	-0.256*** (0.0493)	-0.268*** (0.0484)
Employed	-0.0603 (0.143)	-0.0840 (0.140)	-0.0646 (0.143)	-0.0718 (0.139)
Immigration	-0.228*** (0.0712)	-0.252*** (0.0703)	-0.225*** (0.0713)	-0.252*** (0.0691)
EU Opinion	-0.301*** (0.0732)	-0.336*** (0.0720)	-0.297*** (0.0722)	-0.338*** (0.0711)
Interest	-0.120 (0.102)	-0.113 (0.100)	-0.138 (0.100)	-0.141 (0.0998)
Income	-0.0164* (0.00955)	-0.0164* (0.00943)	-0.0165* (0.00963)	-0.0152 (0.00948)
Working Class	0.281** (0.115)	0.281** (0.113)	0.272** (0.114)	0.288*** (0.111)
Ideology	0.147*** (0.0235)	0.142*** (0.0228)	0.152*** (0.0232)	0.146*** (0.0227)
Constant	2.975*** (0.471)	2.612*** (0.471)	2.835*** (0.458)	2.485*** (0.463)
Observations	1,657	1,647	1,655	1,658

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A3. Probit Models with Trust Disaggregated: Italy

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Probability of Voting for the M5S				
Trust in Parliament	-0.196*** (0.0698)			
Trust in Parties		-0.382*** (0.0782)		
Trust in the President			-0.189*** (0.0616)	
Trust in the Banks				-0.0457 (0.0319)
Incumbent Evaluations	-0.0502** (0.0228)	-0.0492** (0.0227)	-0.0418* (0.0242)	-0.0610*** (0.0229)
College Educated	0.145 (0.111)	0.131 (0.111)	0.120 (0.110)	0.114 (0.110)
Married	0.118 (0.117)	0.107 (0.116)	0.144 (0.117)	0.116 (0.116)
Catholic	0.0917 (0.173)	0.129 (0.172)	0.117 (0.173)	0.0596 (0.173)
Employed	-0.126 (0.102)	-0.115 (0.102)	-0.146 (0.103)	-0.148 (0.101)
Unskilled Worker	0.418** (0.212)	0.393* (0.217)	0.457** (0.217)	0.430** (0.211)
Ideology	-0.0672*** (0.0196)	-0.0629*** (0.0197)	-0.0757*** (0.0198)	-0.0692*** (0.0197)
Religious Attendance	-0.00770 (0.0212)	-0.00684 (0.0210)	-0.00785 (0.0212)	-0.00587 (0.0210)
Immigration Opinion	0.0104 (0.0317)	0.0222 (0.0320)	-0.00621 (0.0313)	-0.00368 (0.0311)
Interest	0.119* (0.0620)	0.111* (0.0624)	0.111* (0.0618)	0.110* (0.0615)
EU Opinion	-0.127** (0.0642)	-0.118* (0.0648)	-0.0711 (0.0662)	-0.122* (0.0636)
Female	0.0348 (0.0988)	0.0101 (0.101)	0.0424 (0.0983)	0.0380 (0.0978)
Age	-0.0184*** (0.00339)	-0.0183*** (0.00339)	-0.0184*** (0.00344)	-0.0195*** (0.00339)
Constant	0.566* (0.323)	0.720** (0.327)	0.647** (0.322)	0.374 (0.309)
Observations	1,100	1,103	1,103	1,109

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table A4. Multinomial Models with Lega Nord Voters Excluded: Italy

	Voting Left Alliance v. Incumbent	Voting Right-Coalition v. Incumbent	Voting M5S v. Incumbent
Institutional Trust	0.148** (0.0670)	0.00234 (0.0798)	-0.136* (0.0738)
Evaluations of the Incumbent	-0.439*** (0.0981)	-0.548*** (0.127)	-0.610*** (0.103)
Ideology	-0.869*** (0.0959)	0.519*** (0.110)	-0.401*** (0.0943)
Immigration Opinion	0.140 (0.116)	-0.0682 (0.133)	0.0632 (0.126)
EU Opinion	0.00963 (0.236)	-0.162 (0.274)	-0.149 (0.247)
College Educated	-0.655* (0.358)	-0.629 (0.384)	-0.456 (0.362)
Employed	-0.120 (0.367)	-0.280 (0.442)	-0.397 (0.381)
Unskilled Worker	0.565 (1.156)	0.849 (1.134)	1.211 (1.164)
Married	-0.380 (0.400)	-0.308 (0.451)	-0.164 (0.419)
Catholic	-1.089 (0.816)	-0.822 (1.034)	-1.032 (0.846)
Religious Attendance	-0.00840 (0.0776)	-0.0964 (0.0957)	-0.0863 (0.0794)
Immigration Opinion	0.140 (0.116)	-0.0682 (0.133)	0.0632 (0.126)
Interest	0.205 (0.212)	-0.175 (0.249)	0.252 (0.222)
Female	-0.254 (0.329)	-0.387 (0.383)	-0.196 (0.344)
Age	0.00265 (0.0130)	0.00981 (0.0132)	-0.0330** (0.0133)
Constant	7.038*** (1.560)	1.638 (1.817)	9.419*** (1.586)
Observations	736	736	736

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

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